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ANALYSIS OF SALES AND USE TAX EXEMPTIONS -
WITH COMMENT AS TO MORE UNIFORM APPLICATIONS
GEORGE D. BRABSON*
There are, generally speaking, three broad areas of exemption under
statutes imposing sales and use taxes in the United States. These are:
(a) Exemptions arising out of the immunities of governmental
agencies and instrumentalities, or out of the exercise of govern-
mental functions.
(b) Exemptions arising under the commerce clause of the fed-
eral constitution.
(c) Specific exemptions created out of governmental taxing
policies or social economic considerations.
Each of these areas of exemption has grown up somewhat hap-
hazardly over a substantial period of time, and very largely as the
result of shifting judicial opinion, rather than as a matter of con-
sistent legislative policy. As a consequence it may be said that the
whole body of exemptions rests upon premises that have somewhat
dubious legal foundation and somewhat incongruous legal concepts.
For example, the concept of states rights from the extremist point of
view, which prevailed during the first half century of our Republic,
underwent a drastic and startling revision as the result of the Civil
War and the revolutionary change in public sentiment which followed
it. In that process a large body of judicial opinion dealing with the im-
munity of the federal government from any encroachment whatever
by the several states and based largely on the bold opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall, began to give way to the stronger demands of an
economic system based upon the nineteenth century industrial revolu-
tion.
Even more drastic changes in our concepts of taxation were oc-
casioned by later governmental emergencies. The demands placed
upon the national economy as the results of two world conflicts have
in effect changed our pattern of thinking as to sources of revenue, and
given rise to an entirely different method of taxation. It was not until
these critical demands had to be met that it became incumbent upon
both federal and state governments to re-examine the grounds for
exemption from all forms of taxation, including not only sales and use
taxes and other excise taxes, but also income taxes. The depression
years of the nineteen thirties accentuated these demands, and empha-
sized the need for a finer application of the principles of tax exemption.
* Tax Attorney, The Ohio Oil Company, Findlay, Ohio.
EXEMPTIONS
EXEMPTIONS ARISING FROM GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITIES AND FUNCTIONS
It is a little surprising to note that up until as late as 1939 the great
prepondeiance of governmental activities, both federal and state, were
deemed to be exempt from sales or use taxes.' Every acre of federal
land or of occupation was looked upon as a sort of oasis in which no
state taxes could be imposed upon the sales or other business activities
carried on there. As late as 1940 it was held in the case of Minnesota
v. Ristine2 that a state had no authority to collect a use or privilege
tax on gasoline sold in a federal reservation.
There can be no question but that this was the general rule up until
passage of the Hayden-Cartwright Act 3 by Congress in 1936, and that
the rule was applicable to sales, use, storage and other types of license
taxes. The very breadth and extent of the exemption was in fact re-
sponsible in part for enactment of the Hayden-Cartwright Act. Senator
Hayden, in his supporting argument on the bill before Congress, gave
numerous situations and citations indicating that the states were being
deprived of a vast amount of revenues, and were virtually helpless in
their efforts to collect excise taxes in any form where the transaction
took place in a federal territory or area.
A simple example of this type of governmental exemption should
be sufficient to illustrate the inequitable consequences both as between
the taxing state and the federal government, and between the taxing
state and a neighboring state. In most of our western states federal
land holdings are extensive, and in some cases exceed the areas
privately owned. In certain cases federal reservations occupy up to
the center line of a city street, with the result that traders federally
licensed could sell free of any taxes on one side of the street, while
private merchants across the street were subject to such sales, use
and license taxes as the state chose to levy. A mile or so away, across
a state line, no such taxes were imposed.4 Thus the taxing jurisdiction
found itself competing for revenue against both tax-free jurisdictions,
and the merchants in the taxing state were competing against tax-
free sales in the same situations.
The Hayden-Cartwright Act provided in substance that all taxes
levied by any state upon sales of gasoline and other motor fuels could
be levied in the same manner and to the same extent upon such fuels
sold in any federal territory or area, except when sold to or for the
1. See the discussion in COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, TAx SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD 168 (7th ed. 1938).
2. 36 F. Supp. 3 (D. Minn. 1940), rev'd sub. nom. Minnesota v. Keeley,
126 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1942).
3. 49 STAT. 1521 (1936).
4. NATIONAL Ass'N TAX ADM'RS, REPORTS (Annual Conf. 1939).
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exclusive use of th&'federal governmeit. The act was first construed
to apply only to sales taxes on gasoline and motor fuels, and not to
use or license taxes relative to such fuels.5 Debate also arose as to the
inherent limitations of the act, and as to the advisability of extending
its provisions so as to cover not only gasoline and motor fuels but
also to embrace taxes which might be imposed upon other business
activities on government owned property.
As a result Congress passed in December 1940 what was in effect
an amendment to the Hayden-Cartwright Act, and generally referred
to as the Buck Act.6 This new act provided in substance that all kinds
and types of businesses carried on in whole or in part in federal
territories or areas located within a state or states, would be subject
to the same sales, use, license, income and other taxes of general ap-
plication imposed by such state or states upon similar transactions
in such state or states.
It was soon apparent, however, that the Hayden-Cartwright Act
was not a panacea for all the conflicts arising from governmental
immunities. As late as 1928 the Supreme Court had held in Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi7 that a state was without authority to levy any
kind of tax on sales made to the federal government. In the Indian
Motorcycle Co. case,8 decided shortly thereafter, the Court held that
a federal excise tax could not be levied on motorcycles purchased
by a state or one of its political subdivisions, if done in the exercise
of a governmental function of the state, and not in its proprietary
capacity.
Notwithstanding these decisions certain of the states insisted upon
the application of their sales and use taxes to transactions entered
into within their boundaries by such federal agencies as national banks
and other federal agencies. In 1934 the Supreme Court held, however,
in Standard Oil Co. v. California9 that retail sales taking place in a
post exchange on the Presidio constituted sales by an agency of the
federal government and were not subject to the California license
tax. As a result of this decision, as well as the strong opposition
from federal purchasing agencies to such levies, the State of California
amended its act so as to exempt virtually all sales to the federal
government from the California tax.
Other states, such as Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin,
also took action either by act of the legislatures or through adminis-
trative regulations to exempt gasoline and motor fuels from sales tax
5. Minnesota v. Ristine, 36 F. Supp. 3 (D. Minn. 1940).
6. 54 STAT. 1060 (1940).
7. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
8. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
9. 291 U.S. 242 (1934).
[ VOL. 9
EXEMPTIONS
where they were soldtoa. federal agency or to a contractor working
for the federal government., Up to 1940, in addition to these specific
exemptions as to motor fuels, at least fifteen of the states had granted
a general exemption from sales tax on. all materials and supplies sold
to federal government contractors, or used by them in carrying out
government contracts. 10
In the various decisions coming out of the courts, both state and fed-
eral, some very fine lines of distinction were drawn. In certain cases
the courts stressed the. fact that unless the agency involved were
exercising a strictly governmental function no exemption from tax
would be allowed." In certain other cases the courts held that sales
taxes might be imposed upon independent contractors performing
services for the United States, but not upon cost-plus contractors, who
were presumably acting as agencies of the federal government.' 2 In
other cases it was held that to grant such exemption from sales taxes
imposed on contractors dealing with the federal government would
cause unconscionable burdens upon the states, and hence should not
be allowed.
13
Some of the confusion arising from this line of cases was dispelled
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the now ubiqui-
tously cited King & Boozer case.1 4 In that case the State of Alabama
sought to impose its retail sales tax on King & Boozer, lumber mer-
chants in Alabama supplying lumber on order of the contractor who
was building, on a cost-plus basis, army camp buildings in that state.
Two arguments were advanced by federal attorneys in opposing the
tax: first, that the contractor was working under a cost-plus contract
and hence was in legal effect an agency of the federal government; and
second, that the economic burden of the tax was in effect imposed
upon the government, which should not have its governmental opera-
tions curtailed by increases in costs.
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. Regardless of the
precise nature of the contract, the contractors were obligated to pay
the tax as part of the total cost of the lumber. Hence, the contractors,
not the government, were the actual purchasers. This obligation to
pay the tax, said the court, was not relieved merely because they
were acting in a loose sense on behalf of the government. Nor were
they relieved of the obligation merely because the economic burden
10. The list included Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Da-
kota, Utah and Washington.
11. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931), and cases
cited therein.
12. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) (sale of gasoline).
13. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (state gross sales
and income tax).
14. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
1956 ] 297 '
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of the tax could be shifted by them to the government as the ultimate
consumer. The contractors did not take on the character as agents of
the federal government either to enter into contracts or pledge its
credit. Thus the tax was not a levy on the federal government, and
hence could invoke no governmental immunity.
The rationale of the King & Boozer case was as effective in the state
legislatures and administrative agencies as it was in the courts. It
was broad enough in its language virtually to eliminate the wide ex-
emptions based on the theory of implied agency which had thereto-
fore been accepted by the states. As a consequence, several state
legislatures amended their sales tax acts eliminating the broad exemp-
tions covering sales to contractors and other persons dealing with or on
behalf of the federal government. Other states modified their admin-
istrative rules so as to eliminate the exemption except in special cases,
as when the contractor is specifically authorized to act on behalf of a
federal purchasing agency.15
As a result of its decision in the King & Boozer case the Supreme
Court reviewed a number of later cases in which sales on government
territory were involved. In Query v. United States16 the State of
S6iith Carolina was attempting to impose its license tax on the
privilege of selling certain articles upon sales made at army post ex-
changes located in that state. The precise question raised by the
Supreme Court was whether the language in the Buck Act prohibited
the imposition of the tax on the post exchange as "on or from the
United States or any instrumentality thereof." The Court then held
that a post exchange was an integral part of the War Department and
partook of whatever immunities that Department had under the
Constitution and federal statutes.
In the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson,7 the State of California
sought to impose its license tax on vendors of gasoline and motor fuels,
upon sales of such fuels made by regular distributors of Standard Oil
Company to army post exchanges located in that state. The Supreme
Court of California upheld the tax on the ground that a post ex-
change was not a federal agency but was related to it only in a con-
tractual capacity. The United States Supreme Court held, however,
that the establishment of post exchanges was a matter controlled by
federal law; that under federal law and War Department regulations
such exchanges have been made integral parts of the War Department
and deemed by it to be essential for the performance of governmental
functions, and share in fulfilling duties entrusted to that Department.
15. See the South Dakota Sales Tax Law, S.D. CODE § 57.3202 (Supp. 1952);
New Mexico Gross Income Tax Act, N.M. STAT. § 72-16-5 (1953).
16. 316 U.S. 486 (1942).
17. 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
[ VOL. 9
EXEMPTIONS
Hence the Court held that post exchanges are "arms of the govern-
ment" and are not subject to state sales or license taxes on transac-
tions arising from such operations.
A review of the more recent decisions of the federal courts dealing
with the governmental immunities to sales taxes and similar license
and excise taxes indicates that these courts are still somewhat un-
certain as to the application of James v. Dravo Contracting Co.'8 and
the King & Boozer case. On the one hand, the Supreme Court said in
Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.,19 decided in 1952, that the State of
Tennessee could not impose sales and use taxes on materials purchased
and used by private contractors in performing contracts for the
Atomic Energy Commission, since the Atomic Energy Act gives an
express exemption from state and local taxation. Again, in Federal
Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co.20 it was held that the broad ex-
emption from taxation given by Congress to federal land banks would
avoid the imposition of a North Dakota sales tax levied on sales of
lumber for repair of its bank properties in that state. On the other
hand, in Black Hawk Consolidated Mines Co. v. Gallegos,21 the court
held that a corporation engaged in selling gold and silver to the United
States Government is not acting as an agency of the Government in
making such sales and is subject to the New Mexico gross sales tax.
Taxing officials in most of the states which impose sales and license
taxes are obviously uncertain as to the application of these rulings to
federal transactions. In South Dakota the Attorney General has
ruled that sales of tangible property to the Production Credit Corpora-
tions organized under the federal enabling act, are not to governmental
agencies, but are to entities distinct from the federal government, and
hence subject to sales taxes in that state. 2 On the other hand, the
same office had ruled earlier that a soil conservation district was a
governmental subdivision, and hence sales of materials and gasoline
used by the district officials were not subject to sales taxes.
23
One of the most interesting manifestations of this uncertainty on
the part of state taxing officials is found in a case recently decided in
Indiana. In that case the State of Indiana sought to impose its gross
income tax (sales tax) on that portion of the receipts of a gasoline dis-
tributor which represented the federal gasoline tax. The taxpayer
argued successfully that it was simply a collection agency for the
federal government so far as the federal tax was concerned; that the
amount collected could never become the property of the taxpayer,
18. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
19. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
20. 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
21. 52 N.M. 74, 191 P.2d 996 (1948).
22. Opinions Att'y Gen., South Dakota (Sept. 10, 1952).
23. Opinions Att'y Gen., South Dakota (Dec. 19, 1939).
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and was, therefore, not- includible, in gross income subject to the
Indiana tax. While that case was decided in favor of the taxpayer,
24
the State of Indiana refuses to acquiesce in the decision, and is now
preparing a new case for presentation to the courts.
From the foregoing analysis of the leading cases on the subject of
governmental immunities, it becomes apparent that there has been at
least a modicum of homogeneity in the decisions of the various courts,
both state and federal, involving this type of exemptions. There are
perhaps two reasons for this. In the first place, the decided cases in
the majority of instances have arisen in regard to a narrow and
confined area of law, to-wit, the power of one sovereign state to lay
a tax upon the sovereign functions of another state. In the second
place, the legislatures in the various states have over the years and
from time to time expressly recognized the principle of governmental
immunity by the enactment of specific provisions granting the exemp-
tion in more or less uniform statutory language. This is particularly
true of the sales and use tax statutes which have been enacted by the
various states in the last twenty-five years.
As a result we find that the courts have not differed radically in
their construction of the almost uniform wording found in the statutes.
We find likewise that while there have been many divergences among
the decisions dealing with particular items, this can be attributed
largely to the factual situations, rather than to wide differences in the
legal concepts of immunity and exemption from tax. In short, there
has been very little variation in the decisions in the various states as to
the meaning of the statutory language itself or as to the principles of
law involved.
EXEMPTIONS ARISING UNDER THE COMMERcE CLAUSE
It goes without saying that the most prolific source of exemptions
from sales and use taxes lies in the field of interstate commerce.
It is natural that this should be so. The constitutional limitations
against burdening or interfering with the flow of commerce between
the states have been with us since the beginning, and have always
occasioned controversy. This type of controversy began as early as
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,25 and even in the earliest cases a
distinction was made between taxes which imposed a direct burden
on interstate commerce or which discriminated against interstate
commerce, and those which could be said to merely affect such com-
merce.
It is a matter of constitutional history to observe that up until the
24. Associated Serv. Corp. v. Gross Income Tax Div., Superior Ct., Marion
County, Ind., March, 1955.
25. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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depression of- the nineteen thirties the provisions. of the commerce
clause had always been strictly construed,- -and almost invariably
favored the preservation of the- strongly federalist doctrines es-
tablished by Justice :Marshall. It was not until the courts -began
to feel the economic and social pressures of the depression-conscious
state legislatures that a more liberal construction of the commerce
clause appeared.
It is, of course, elementary and the courts have always recognized
that not all forms of taxation constitute control or regulation over
interstate commerce. The courts had said that "even interstate
commerce must pay its way," and the bare fact that a person is
engaged in such commerce does not relieve him of all taxes simply
because they add to the cost of doing business.26
Nevertheless the first- important departure from the strict rules of
the John Marshall school did not occur until the early nineteen
thirties. In two cases arising in South Carolina27 and in Iowa,2 each
involving state taxes imposed upon the sale and storage of gasoline,
the Supreme Court held that gasoline imported from other states for
use in supplying interstate carriers was subject to a sales tax or
license tax which applied equally to all users of gasoline, and did
not discriminate against interstate commerce. In the Monomotor Oil
case,29 the Court said that it would no longer treat as a burden on
commerce a license fee imposed on all motor fuel sold or disposed of
in Iowa, regardless of where the shipments originated, or whether
interstate shipments by a local distributor were made direct to local
consumers from outside that state. The Iowa license fee was in its
effects, of course, no less than a sales tax on the commodities sold.
The next step in the development of this new doctrine was to hold
that after property transported in interstate commerce has become
part of the common mass of'property within a state it may be sub-
jected to a tax by that state imposed upon the use or consumption
of such property. The Supreme Court made that decision in Henne-
ford v. Silas Mason Co.30 in 1937 and sustained the right of the State
of Washington to impose a compensating use tax on all articles
imported into that state which would have been subject to sales tax if
purchased within the state.
Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court of Alabama broadened the
doctrine again in the case of Graybar Electric Co. v..Curry.31 In
that case the State of Alabama imposed a license tax on local
retail dealers measured by gross receipts of the dealer from sales.
26. Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
27. Eastern Air Transp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932).
28. Monomotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
29. Ibid.
30. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
31. 238 Ala. 116, 189 So. 186, aff'd, 308 U.S. 513 (1939).
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An Alabama dealer took an order from a local customer for certain
articles to be shipped f.o.b. from the manufacturer in Ohio directly to
the Alabama customer. The Court held that the amount of such
sales was includible in the gross receipts of the dealer and hence
subject to the tax, even though the effects of the tax were to in-
crease the cost of doing business. The case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, and was affirmed without opinion.23
Meanwhile the Supreme Court had rendered another decision
which, although it dealt with a privilege tax, opened the door to
a further extension of the new doctrine. In the case of Western
Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue,33 the State of New Mexico imposed
a license tax on publishers of magazines in that state measured by
the gross sales of advertising space. The Court held the tax was valid
even though the magazines were mailed and distributed in interstate
commerce, under the theory that the preparation, printing and pub-
lishing constituted a local business activity, distinct from its cir-
culation in commerce, and that the burden on such commerce was
too remote to call for a rigid application of the rule prohibiting the
use of gross receipts from interstate commerce as the measure of a
tax.
The Supreme Court had now laid the groundwork for an even
further extension of the doctrine permitting the taxation by the
states of property actually flowing in the channels of interstate com-
merce. The opportunity to make such a decision appeared in the
well-known case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.
34
In that case the City of New York imposed its sales tax on coal
mined in Pennsylvania, sold by the mining company through its
offices in New York City through salesmen and telephone contacts
working in such offices. The Supreme Court held inter alia:
(1) That a sales tax levied on every purchaser of merchandise in a state
regardless of the source of the merchandise does not violate the com-
merce clause merely because it has moved in interstate commerce
immediately before transfer of possession to the purchaser.
(2) That a sales tax conditioned on delivery of possession to a purchaser
within a state is based upon a local business activity which, apart
from its effect on interstate commerce, is subject to the taxing power
of a state, and hence such a tax does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce.
(3) That such a tax has no different effect upon interstate commerce than
a tax on the use of property which has just been moved in the
channels of commerce. Citing Monomotor Oil Co. v. Johnson.35
32. 308 U.S. 513 (1939).
33. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
34. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
35. 309 U.S. at 49, 55, 58.
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In the companion case of McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.3
a somewhat different situation was presented. There an Illinois manu-
facturer of business machines sold them to customers in New York
City through offices located there. The orders were sent to Illinois
for acceptance, and the machines shipped directly to the purchasers,
who remitted by check to the Illinois office. The Court held that such
sales were subject to the New York City sales tax for the same
reasons cited in the Berwind-White case, and that such a tax did
not "lay an undue burden on interstate commerce."
There can be no doubt whatever but that the transactions in the
Berwind-White, Felt & Tarrant and Du Grenier 7 cases, all involved
sales which would have been considered as interstate commerce a
decade or so previously. In contemporary cases the Court even went
so far as to treat a sale of merchandise ordered by telephone from
New York City to a coal company in New Jersey as subject to the
New'York City sales tax.3 It is difficult to fathom the nature of the
business activity to which the tax could attach in such cases.
The utilization of a compensating use or consumption tax to protect
local vendors against competition from other states received recogni-
tion first by the courts in the State of Washington. In Vancouver Oil
Co. v. Henneford39 the court sustained a use tax broadly imposed on
all forms of personal property, holding that the tax was not a prop-
erty tax, but an excise tax and hence free from constitutional limita-
tions on property taxes. The court also held that the tax was not a
burden on interstate commerce since it was imposed only after the
flow of interstate commerce had ceased. In Southern Pacific Co. v.
Gallagher40 the United States Supreme Court upheld a similar tax
in California, holding that there was no discrimination against inter-
state commerce so long as the use tax was imposed on the same basis
as the sales tax which was imposed upon California vendors. To
the same effect was the California case of Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Gallagher.41
From the foregoing analysis of the cases up to 1940, it will be
seen that the courts had developed two distinct lines of reasoning;
one in support of the imposition of sales and license taxes, and
the other in support of the imposition of use taxes. In general, as
to sales taxes and license taxes related to sales, the Supreme Court
of the United States had adhered to the following principles:
36. 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
37. McGoldrick v. A. H. Du Grenier, Inc., 309 U.S. 70 (1940) (companion to
the Felt & Tarrant case).
38. Jagels v. Taylor, 309 U.S. 619 (1940).
39. 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
40. 306 U.S. 167 (1939).
41. 306 U.S. 182 (1939).
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1. The mere- movement of property in interstate commerce is not
enough in itself to command eXemption from taxation.
2. A state sales or license tax which is imposed upon some local business
activity or event and is applicable to all such transactions on the same
basis, does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
3. A state sales tax laid generally on all sales in the state regardless of
the source of the property does not unduly burden interstate com-
merce, where its only relation to interstate commerce arises from its
transportation therein immediately prior to delivery to the customer.
In general as to use and consumption taxes, the Court had made
the following, determinations:
1. The movement of property in interstate commerce terminates when it
comes to rest within a state and becomes part of the common mass of
property therein.
2. A tax on the use, consumption or storage of such property after termina-
tion of an interstate movement is not imposed upon that commerce,
and hence is not a burden upon it.
3. Such a tax imposed upon the same basis and same rates as a sales tax
upon the same kind of property within the state is a compensating
tax which does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Since 1940 a somewhat different trend has appeared in the de-
cisions of' the courts dealing with both sales and use taxes. In
the area of sales (and license) taxes the cases fall into two categories,
i.e., (1) those in which the property sought to be taxed moves from
the taxing state to purchasers outside the state, and (2) those in which
the property moves from vendors outside the taxing state to purchasers
inside that state.
In the case of property moving from the taxing state to purchasers
outside, the trend of decisions seems to be toward exempting all such
transactions from tax.42 In such cases, as foreshadowed in prior de-
cisions, the courts have insisted that there must be a legal obligation
assumed by the vendor to deliver or cause delivery of the property
to the vendee outside the taxing jurisdiction. In such cases it is
immaterial whether the property is shipped f.o.b. point of origin,
or freight prepaid to destination. It is likewise immaterial where
legal title to the property can be said to have passed in such cases.
In the case of property moving from vendors outside the taxing
state to vendees within the taxing state, the trend toward unlimited
application of such taxes has apparently wavered. In the case of
McLeod v. J. E. Dilwortl Co.,43 decided in 1944, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Arkansas in holding
invalid a sales tax imposed upon merchandise manufactured in Ten-
nessee and shipped to purchasers in Arkansas, pursuant to orders
taken by telephone or by travelling salesmen. The Court distinguished
42. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
43. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
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the Berwind-White case on-the ground that the Berwind-White Com-
pany maintained sa]36s offices in Negw York City and'made physical
delivery of the coal there, while in the present case the-vendor's
offices were in Tennessee, the sale was consummated "i Tennessee
hnd delivery was made in-Tennessee in interstate commerce yet to
flow. Thus the Court based its deciSion ultimately'upon the fact that
the "transfer of -ownership" took-place outside the taxing 'state.
A more noticeable trend 'away from the unlimited application of
sales taxes came a few years later in'the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Norton Co. v. Departvient of Revenue.44 'In-that
case the Norton Company, a Massachusetts corporation, having a
branch office in Chicago, made sales to its Illinois customers directly
and also took orders for merchandise to be manufactured and shipped
from Massachusetts to Illinois customers. In certain instances orders
were taken and shipment made from the Chicago warehouse. The
State of Illinois sought to apply its retailers' occupation sales tax to
all sales made by Norton Company in that state. The Supreme Court
denied the right to tax any part of the taxpayer's sales which were
not consummated in Illinois. Said the Court, in a significant with-
drawal from its previous language:
Where a corporation choses to stay at home in all respects except to
send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders which are sent
directly to the home office for acceptance, filling and delivery back to
the buyer, it is obvious that the state of the buyer had no local grip
on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the
transaction within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable.45
Thus the Court has now returned to the much earlier doctrine that
where the taxpayer "could have approached the Illinois market
through solicitors only . . . it would have been entitled to the im-
munity of interstate commerce" as to all its sales. 46
The Supreme Court has shown a still more definite trend away from
the unlimited application of state sales taxes in a series of cases be-
ginning with Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, decided in 1951,
followed by Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone in 1952, Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert in 1954 and Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia in 1954.47 In each of these cases a license or
privilege tax was involved, based, however, upon gross sales or re-
ceipts from doing business in the state. In each case the Supreme
Court denied the right to tax in language somewhat as follows:
44. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
45. Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 538.
47. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Memphis Steam
Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Michigan-Wiscdnsin Pipe Line Co. v.




It is enough to say that we have recently ruled that local incidents
such as gathering up or putting down interstate commodities as an
integral part of their interstate movement are not adequate grounds for
a state license, privilege or occupation tax.
In the area of use taxes a somewhat more drastic change in the
trend of judicial opinion has occurred. This change of trend has come
about largely by reason of the imposition of obligations to collect
and remit taxes levied on foreign corporations. Up until a few years
ago it was assumed that a state could impose virtually any type of
condition upon a foreign corporation entering to do business in
that state.48 For a good many years the various states took advantage
of this and imposed upon foreign corporations the obligation to
collect and remit use taxes.
In several cases prior to 1941 the Supreme Court had sustained
the right of the state to require such compliance with its use tax
statutes. That was precisely the holding of the Court in the Mono-
motor Oil Co. case; the case of Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. re-
emphasized the rule.
In the case of Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 49 the Supreme Court
had held clearly that a mail order house licensed to do business in
Iowa may be required to collect and remit an Iowa use tax on mail
orders sent in to the Chicago warehouses of the taxpayer, even though
such orders were in no way solicited or obtained through local busi-
ness activities in Iowa. The Court said that the unsolicited mail orders
were part of the "full benefits" derived by the taxpayer from its ag-
gregate of business activities in the state and hence subject to the use
tax. To the same effect was the decision in Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward.50
As already pointed out in reference to sales taxes, supra, the early
decisions of the United States Supreme Court exempted from taxation
the bare solicitation of orders in a taxing state, whether by mail, tele-
phone or traveling salesmen.5 1 As a result of depression-years psy-
chology the Court changed its approach and held that where a foreign
corporation maintains offices in a taxing state from which its repre-
sentatives solicit orders, make adjustments, etc., the state may im-
pose a use tax on such orders and require the corporation to collect
and remit such taxes.52 In General Trading Co. v. Tax Commission53
the United States Supreme Court held that even where the corpora-
tiofi had no offices in Iowa and merely sent traveling representatives
48. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) (tax).
49. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
50. 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
51. International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
52. West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 720, 128 P.2d 777
(1942), cert. denie, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
53. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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into the state, the use tax could be imposed since it was "a familiar
and sanctioned device."
It is quite apparent now that this trend in applying use taxes has
reached its high water mark and is receding. In the very recent case
of Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,54 taxpayer, a Delaware manufacturer,
sent its delivery trucks into Maryland to deliver merchandise, ordered
personally or by mail orders sent to the vendor's offices in Delaware.
No offices or warehouses were maintained in Delaware and no sales-
men were sent in. The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court
of Maryland which had followed the General Trading case, and had
sustained the tax. The Supreme Court held in a surprise decision
that no state has a right under the fourteenth amendment to require
a foreign corporation to pay or collect a use tax where it was not en-
gaged in direct selling in that state.
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in the Miller Bros. Co.
case is problematical. That decision may easily be given several
different interpretations, thus: (1) It may well reflect a growing
realization of the Court that a further broadening of the principle of
taxation embraced in the General Trading Co. case might lead to pro-
found and undesirable economic dislocations. (2) It may be construed
as the first effort of the Court to differentiate between the methods of
merchandising which subject one to taxation in a state from methods
which do not. (3) It may reflect only a change in the complexion of
the Court, since Justice Jackson, who wrote the dissenting opinion in
the General Trading Co. case, wrote the majority opinion in the
Miller Bros. Co. case.
In all likelihood the decision actually reflects a point of view em-
bracing all three of the foregoing postulates. Justice Jackson was
frank enough to say in the Miller Bros. Co. opinion that:
Our decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax
is supported, . . .nor are all of our pronouncements during the experi-
mental period of this type of taxation consistent or reconcilable. 55
Such language is quite an admission from that Court. On the other
hand, Justice Jackson also said:
[T]here is a wide gulf between this type of active and aggressive opera-
tion within a taxing state and the occasional delivery of goods sold at
an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the incidental effects
of general advertising. Here there was no invasion or exploitation of
the consumer market in Maryland.5 6
If the Miller Bros. Co. decision means what it says, the principal
import of the case to the public is apparently that in order for a taxing
54. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
55. Id. at 344.
56. Id. at 347.
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state to acquire jurisdiction to compel a foreign corporation to collect
and remit use taxes there must be active and continuous solicitation
made directly in the state by salesmen or agents of the corporation.
If such solicitation results in actual sales, the other activities or
events usually concomitant in consummating the transaction are
more or less -immaterial. Even that, however, would constitute a de-
parture from the much earlier doctrine that the mere solicitation of
business in a taxing state, without more, is not sufficient to subject
a foreign corporation to use tax, or even to a service of process in
that state. Such was the holding of the Supreme Court in the
relatively obscure case of Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co.,5 7 decided in 1918.
All of the many controversies in the field of interstate commerce
which have plagued both state and federal courts have arisen out of
administrative or judicial interpretation of a single provision in the
Federal Constitution-the commerce clause, which is a single sentence
of article I, section 8. It can be said, therefore, that we have had uni-
formity from the beginning so far as basic legislation is concerned. The
very fact that this is so gives rise to a serious question as to whether
mere statutory uniformity between the several states as to other
types of exemptions could be relied upon to produce satisfactory re-
sults.
The least that can be said in respect of the myriad interpretations of
the commerce clause is that they represent a growing concept of en-
larged governmental responsibility in the regulation and control
over all forms of commerce. The growth has not been a consistent or
steady one and it has been influenced by as many political considera-
tions as economic ones. Which again causes us to pause and wonder
if the mechanics of administration of tax exemptions will ever be able
to counter-balance the many other factors which must also be
weighed.
EXMPTIONS ARISING FROM TAXING POLICIES AND SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
As already suggested above, the very fact that sales and use tax
exemptions based on governmental immunity and on the commerce
clause have arisen out of the same relationship to the federal govern-
ment in the case of each of the states-this fact alone has been re-
sponsible for a considerable amount of uniformity in the statutes of
the various states granting such exemptions. There is also the
further fact that the doctrine of exemption by reason of governmental
immunity or by reason of the provisions contained in the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution has been in process of formu-
57. 246 U.S. 79 (1918).
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lation ever since the Constitution became effective. As a result the
process of formulation has of itself become a process of clarification
likewise, to a very considerable extent.
Quite the contrary is true of the statutes in the various states
which have created exemptions arising from political policies and
the socio-economic policies that have prevailed in those states. In
this situation there has been present very little of the leveling in-
fluences which might have tended toward a uniform treatment of such
exemptions. In addition to that, the sales and use tax statutes creating
this type of exemptions are of much more recent vintage, and have
not had the time to develop a period of mellowing and adjustment to
each other.
As a consequence we find that it is in this area of political and
social exemptions that the greatest divergencies appear. It should
be noted that the earliest sales tax law still in effect among the
states was not enacted until 1929,58 and that it was not until the mid-
nineteen thirties that the majority of the present sales and use tax
statutes were enacted.5 9 A number of these acts were enacted in the
early nineteen forties, which also saw the sales tax movement spread
to the municipalities in certain states. A few more have appeared even
more recently, such as the Florida and Georgia sales and use tax acts
which became effective November 1, 1949, and April 1, 1951, re-
spectively.
At a time when general sales taxes have developed into the most
stable form of taxation upon which the post-war economic recovery
of Western Europe has been based, and when those taxes promise to
become the principal sources of revenue in countries having such
great diversities in their social and economic policies as Sweden and
Spain, for example-it seems expedient to re-examine the divergencies
in these social and economic policies among our own states. A recent
study of the problem as it applies to the Western European countries
appeared in recent issues of the National Tax Journal.0 The author
seems justified in his conclusion that multiple-stage sales taxes at
a very low rate and applied on what is virtually an exemptionless
basis, have afforded a very satisfactory medium for the reconstruction
of Western Europe from two world wars, and an intervening period
of world-wide depression.
While the economic and political conditions in Western European
countries do not seem to warrant a direct comparison, the fact re-
mains that sales and use taxes in virtually the same form now furnish
more than half the annual revenues in a number of our own states,
58. West Virginia. An earlier act (1921) was repealed.
59. For example: Arizona, 1933; California, 1933; Colorado, 1935; Illinois,
1933; Iowa, 1933; Indiana, 1933; Michigan, 1933; Ohio, 1933.
60. Due, Sales Taxation in Western Europe, 8 NAT'L TAx J. 171, 300 (1955).
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and have done so consistently over a substantial number of years.
These taxes also provide a large part of the revenues in all of the
other states which impose them.
61
On the face of a simple comparison, it seems doubtful if these di-
versities as expressed in the exemptions in the Western European
countries could rival those that appear in the lists of exemptions
granted in our various states. For example, the State of Alabama,
which enacted both a sales and use tax law in 1940, grants some
nine broad areas of exemption, including farm products, farming tools,
implements and fertilizer, newsprint, textbooks, tobacco products,
motor fuels, and foodstuffs; while the State of Arkansas, its near
neighbor, in its first sales tax law enacted in 1941, exempted only agri-
cultural products from the above list. The present Arkansas law,
which was enacted in 1947, broadens the list of exemptions to some
extent.62 In the State of Ohio the area of exemptions is again a broad
one, covering some twenty categories, while in the adjoining State of
Indiana virtually all types of sales are subject to the gross income tax.
The legal basis for the various, types of exemptions is such that
it would be difficult to challenge them. It is clear that the right of
the several states to levy sales or use taxes on certain types of
transactions may be seriously curtailed by constitutional limitations.0 3
On the other hand, the right of a state to exempt specific items of
property or specific transactions from such taxes appears to have few
constitutional or legal restrictions.64 It seems to be within the legis-
lative power to determine what transactions shall be subject to
tax, and by corollary what transactions shall not be the subject of
taxation.65 Thus, notwithstanding a prior provision in the general
statute conferring a broad exemption on casual sales, the legislature
may by appropriate amendment narrow the exemption so as to
subject specific transactions to the tax, or may authorize the tax
commissioner so to do.
66
It is, of course, a truism that the acts which have conferred the
broadest areas of exemption from sales and use taxes have created
the most difficult problems of enforcement and collection. The Ohio
act is an outstanding example of this. The Ohio law now contains
some fourteen categories of sales which are specifically exempt from
the tax. In addition to that, however, the actual area of exemption is
considerably broadened by certain exceptions to the definition of a
61. See the tabulation in THE EcoNoMIc ALMANAC 595-96 (1952).
62. Such as limited sales to charitable organizations, sales of food in schools,
sale of newspapers, tobacco products and farm products.
63. Haefner v. Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946); Andrews
v. Tax Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 374, 21 N.E.2d 106 (1939).
64. State ex rel. Foster v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 65; 56 N.E.2d 265 (1944);
Fox V. Frank, 52 Ohio App. 483, 198 N.E. 873 (1935).
65. King's Grill v. Evatt, Ohio B.T.A. No. 954 (1941).
66. Omo DEn'T TAXATION, CnIcuLAR No. 1 (May 10, 1955).
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retail sale. Among these exceptions are those where the purpose of
the consumer is (a) to resell; (b) to incorporate into other tangible
property, or to use or consume in the production of other tangible
property which is to be sold; (c) to use as security for the performance
of an obligation of the vendor; (d) to use or consume in certain
personal services; (e) to use or consume as evidence of a contract of
insurance; and (f) to use or consume in commercial fishing.
67
It is in this area of exceptions and exemptions covering industrial
use and consumption that the courts in all the states have had the
greatest difficulty. Whether or not the item in question is to be used
or consumed directly in the production of tangible personal property
for sale by manufacturing, processing, refining, mining or in the
production of crude oil and natural gas, farming, agriculture, horti-
culture or floriculture becomes a distressing and involved question of
fact in practically every situation that is at all controversial. The
courts of Ohio, for example, have been dealing with this sort of
statutory language for some twenty years with a singular lack of
success in settling the issue. The reader who is interested in following
the development of this administrative problem in Ohio will find an
analysis of the leading cases in the footnote below.
68
67. Oxto CODE ANw. § 5546-1 (Throckmorton 1940).
68. As originally enacted by the Ohio General Assembly, the language read
as follows: "to use or consume the thing transferred directly in the produc-
tion of tangible personal property for sale by manufacturing, processing,
refining, miig... production of crude oil and natural gas, farming, agricul-
ture horticulture, or floriculture."
In' Saunders Mills v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 227, 39 N.E.2d 526 (1942), the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that a purchase of motor trucks to haul alfalfa
from fields to a processing plant, was subject to sales tax because the trucks
were engaged solely in transporting prior to the actual process of dehydration.
In Bailey v. Evatt, 142 Ohio St. 616, 53 N.E.2d 812 (1944), the court receded
somewhat and held that motor equipment, shovels, etc., used in stripping soil
from gravel deposits to be mined later by a different method was excepted
from taxation because it was used directly in the mining process.
In France Co. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 455, 55 N.E.2d 652 (1944), the court
held that dump cars used in hauling crushed stone from a screening plant to
adjacent yards where it was washed and mixed were exempt from tax under
the theory that the washing and mixing were part of one continuous process
of manufacture.
In Dye Coal Co. v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 233, 58 N.E.2d 653 (1944), the court
held that trucks used by a mining company to haul coal from pits to tipples
where the coal was cleaned and graded was exempt from tax as "used or
consumed directly in mining."
In Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 120, 77 N.E.2d 921
(1948), the court held that the wrappers and containers used in producing and
selling bread were excepted from the tax because such items rendered the
product more suitable for marketing.
In Fyr-Fyter Co. v. Glander, 150 Ohio St. 118, 80 N.E.2d 776 (1948), the
court held that a sale of fire extinguishers to a coal company was a taxable
sale because such equipment was not used directly in the production of the
taxpayer's products for sale by mining. The court, for the first time, said that
the word "directly" was intended to narrow the exemption to a point where
only an item which was indispensable to and usually employed in the busi-
ness could be deemed to come within the exception.
In Terteling Bros., Inc. v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236, 85 N.E.2d 379 (1949); the
court held that machinery and equipment used by a company under a strip
1956 ]
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The courts have had equal difficulty in their attempts to determine
when an item is "used directly in making retail sales," or is "used di-
rectly in the rendition of a public utility service." These are areas
which are free of sales taxation in many states, either by exceptions
to the definition of what constitutes a sale, or by specific exemption.
Again, the State of Ohio may be cited as an example in which courts
have been entangled for years in an effort to apply a statute, which
seems more vague and indefinite with each interpretation. A short
analysis of the leading cases in Ohio is contained in the footnote be-
low. 69
mining contract on the land of a public utility company which took the coal
at the contract price, was not subject to sales tax, the latter being engaged
in rendering a public utility service.
In Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v. Glander, 152 Ohio St. 497, 90 N.E.2d 366 (1950),
the court went to the other extreme and held that cranes and like machinery
used to move the materials of taxpayer to a central location where the mixing
process began, were not used directly in the production of the asphalt be-
cause they were not part of the actual process, and hence were subject to
the tax.
In Mead Corp. v. Glander, 153 Ohio St. 539, 93 N.E.2d 19 (1950), the
court apparently realizing its departure from the normal, held that cranes and
equipment used primarily in moving woodpulp from storage to the processing
mill, but also used for other purposes, were exempt from sales tax regard-
less of the incidental or secondary uses, and even though the transportation
took place prior to the actual processing.
69. One of the earliest decisions dealing with this problem was a ruling of
the Ohio Department of Taxation, issued in 1935 (Tax Commissioner's Rulings
1935),' holding that table linens sold to a restaurant were exempt as "used
directly in making retail sales."
On the other hand, in Sales Tax Bulletin No. 73 (1936), the Department
ruled that none of the equipment used by a retail store in its rest rooms was
used to "consummate retail sales," but merely as a convenience to customers,
and therefore not exempt.
In a similar ruling, No. 80 (March, 1937), it was held that printed matter
such as advertisements or sales bulletins were not "used directly in making
retail sales," unless the final use is such as to assist in consummating retail
sales and not merely to promote sales; but that such items used in the sales
rooms would be presumptively exempt of tax.
In a later ruling, No. 43 (revised in October, 1947), this presumption was
eliminated, and taxpayers were required to offer evidence as to the final
use.
In Tax Bulletin (1937), at 21, the Tax Commissioner ruled that cash reg-
isters and accounting machines were not taxable when actually used on
"retail premises."
In Cincinnati Hotel Co. v. Evatt, Ohio B.T.A. (Sept. 20, 1940), it was held
that forms used to inventory and check food supplies in a restaurant were
taxable because not used directly in the sale of the meals.
In John Mark, Inc. v. Evatt, Ohio B.T.A. (Feb. 1945), the Board held that
the equipment in a dining car moved on wheels to a leased location and
used to prepare meals for sale to the public, was exempt from tax as property
used directly in making retail sales of meals.
In International Harvester Co. v. Glander, Ohio B.T.A. (Nov. 1945), it was
held that a fleet of trucks purchased for use to make retail sales and de-
liveries of ice to the public was exempt, even though part of the sales of ice
were to commercial users (a non-exempt use).
In Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 120, 77 N.E.2d
921 (1948), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a carton and a bag used to
place around ice cream and like products to protect against thawing on the
way to customers' salesrooms were used directly in the making of such sales,
and hence were exempt.
In Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 511, 99 N.E.2d
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A brief examination of these cases provokes two interesting observa-
tions. In the first place, it is of interest to note that the Ohio statute was
designed to cover several situations, each differing from the others
as to their character and as to purpose. A sale made to a purchaser
whose purpose is to use the article in the production of property for
sale by manufacturing, processing, etc., obviously differs in kind and
character from a sale of the article to a purchaser whose purpose is
to use the article in making retail sales. Nevertheless the statute
fails to take these factual differences into account in prescribing what
amounts to a blanket type of exemption.
In the second place it should be noted that the decisions of the
courts in Ohio have failed to take these differences into account in
applying tests of taxability in the various types of cases that have
been presented. In the decisions dealing with sales of an article to'
be used in industrial processing or manufacturing, for example, will
be found citations and tests of taxability dealing with sales where
the article is to be used in making retail sales. It seems too obvious
for comment that the tests of taxability of -a sale for use in industrial
processing would have no bearing whatever on a sale where the
purpose was to use the thing sold for making retail sales, or render-
ing a public utility service, or to incorporate it into other property,
or to use it in industrial cleaning or like services, or to resell it as
such. The irrelevance of cases dealing with any one of these purposes
to cases dealing with the other purposes seems apparent to the tax
practitioner.
One point is, of course, that it is difficult if not impossible to cover
the exemptions from taxation in a wide range of activities with one
definition for all the types of activities which are involved. The
making of a sale at retail is a completely different sort of activity
from rendering a public utility service. It is difficult to understand
how a legislature could apply the same definition of taxability in
both situations.
A second point is that by applying the same tests of taxability to
widely different types of activities the courts have become confused
as to the areas in which the particular test of exemption should be
applied. As a result the cases which were a precedent for one type of
649 1951), the Ohio Supreme Court held that self-addressed envelopes and
container envelopes are exempt as used directly in making retail sale§ of
magazines.
On the other hand, in Elder & Johnson v. Glander, 156 Ohio St. 445, 103
N.E.2d 392 (1952), the same court held that advertising mats and engravings
used in newspaper advertising of similar products were taxable.
To refine the rule still further, the Ohio Department of Taxation held in
Circular 21 (Aug. 31, 1954), that advertising matter sold *to a mortician was




activity have been erroneously cited in support of an entirely different
kind of activity.
This statutory vagueness in defining what shall constitute a retail
sale and what is excepted or exempted from taxation is true of the
language found in the majority of the states imposing sales and use
taxes. In Oklahoma, for example, the statute lists a series of about
twenty exemptions, somewhat comparable to the exemptions and
exceptions under the Ohio statute, but with even more summary
treatment so far as the statutory language is concerned.70 In Colorado
the statute, while purporting to tax all retail sales other than that
sold for resale, then proceeds to list some twenty odd areas of
exempt sales in a series of sections analogous to the Oklahoma stat-
ute.71 Needless to say, the administrative agencies and the courts
in these states have had endless difficulty in attempting to apply the
exemptions.
In California the statute contains numerous sections excluding
certain persons, occupations and professions from the definition, plus
a list of specific types of transactions as exempt from the tax.72 The
general theory of exclusions is that the occupation or profession is
a consumer of the materials sold, and is not a retailer, hence is not
subject to the tax. The list of exemptions includes agricultural prod-
ucts, commercial fishing, newspapers, publications, occasional sales,
meals served in businesses and institutions, and a host of miscellaneous
food products. The statutory language granting the exemptions was
conceived over a substantial period of time, and is based upon such in-
congruous premises that the courts of California have been plagued
with more cases asking for clarification of the exemption than any
other state.
The statutes of Wyoming and Alabama appear to qualify those
states as having the most numerous exemptions from both sales and
use taxes.73 It is of interest to note that the per capita sales tax collec-
tions in both states have ranked consistently low in comparison with
states having fewer exemptions, and the general efficiency of this
form of taxation as a revenue producer has ranked likewise.
In conclusion it should be observed that in those states where
sales and use taxes have become substantial sources of revenue the
primary concern of the administrative officials has been with regard
to exemptions. This has become increasingly so in the post-war years
since 1945, when virtually all those states have been forced into
greatly expanded governmental functions with no corresponding ex-
70. 68 Onio STAT. § 1251d (1941).
71. Carpenter v. Carman Distributing Co., 111 Colo. 566, 144 P.2d 770 (1943).
72. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 635-685 (Deering 1952).
73. Wyoming has a combined total of at least twenty-two kinds of exemp-
tions. Alabama has a total of twenty-one, plus various exceptions.
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pansion of the sources of revenue. Definite efforts are being made
by the tax administrators in many states either to reduce greatly the
areas of exemption or to eliminate them altogether, in favor of a re-
duction in the rate of taxation. It would appear, therefore, that
unless the imponderable arguments of political consideration take
over, the virtual elimination of exemptions in this area may win out
in the race with uniformity.
